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Abstract—This paper investigates how secure information
sharing with external vendors can be achieved in an Industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT). It also identifies necessary security
requirements for secure information sharing based on identified
security challenges stated by the industry. The paper then
proposes a roadmap for improving security in IIoT which investi-
gates both short-term and long-term solutions for protecting IIoT
devices. The short-term solution is mainly based on integrating
existing good practices. The paper also outlines a long term
solution for protecting IIoT devices with fine-grained access
control for sharing data between external entities that would
support cloud-based data storage.
Index Terms—Industrial internet, Internet of Things, secure
information sharing, access control, roadmap
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Industrial Internet describes industrial processes con-trolled by SCADA systems and similar that are being
networked and interconnected across the value chain to create
smart integrated production systems. The Industrial Internet
phenomenon embraces the Internet of Things (IoT) domain,
where smart production based on RFID tagged products and
sensor networks are being integrated into an Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT). This allows for improving the quality,
traceability and integrity of industrial processes by allowing
better modeling of the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and
processes using techniques such as data mining, big data
analysis, learning systems and knowledge-based systems using
semantic modeling and ontologies.
It also improves maintainability, reliability and availability
of the controlled industrial processes by using sensor networks
for Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) in order to monitor
wear and pre-failure of technical components. This reduces the
risk of system breakdowns during production, and allows for
planned exchange or upgrade of production equipment with
lower risk of excessive downtime during repairs.
The most important actors considered in this article are:
• Industrial organisations that want to introduce Internet of
Things (new markets).
• Industrial organisations that require secure exchange of
information related to IoT or need information related to
their supplied equipment.
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• Third party organisations that require limited access to
some of the sensor data, for example vendors providing
sensor or equipment maintenance or managed security
service operator equipment.
An important objective for manufacturers is to improve the
production efficiency whilst reducing planned and unexpected
downtime. IoT may help to achieve this goal, however in order
to do this, any efficiency improvements must be measurable.
The Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) is a well-known
metric of manufacturing efficiency that can be used for this. It
is defined in terms of the availability A, performance efficiency
P and quality rate Q as OEE = A · P ·Q.
A problem with OEE, is that it in itself is not sufficient,
since it only provides the status of production efficiency, and
blurs the relationship between performance and cost involved
in sustaining a given OEE level [1]. It does for example
not show the relationship between invisible pre-failure and
wear conditions and the production performance. Furthermore,
when a device eventually has failed, possibly interrupting
production, then this will already have caused a loss in
production efficiency.
Data mining from condition-based maintenance monitoring
sensors is therefore one area where production companies can
improve productivity beyond what OEE easily can measure.
This allows for performing predictive fault analysis and control
functions in order to provide more resilient effectiveness [1].
IoT systems helps in laying the foundations for such pre-
dictive manufacturing by providing the essential structure of
smart sensor networks and smart machines [1]. Communi-
cation protocols, such as the Object Linked Embedded for
Process Control, Uniformed Architecture (OPC-UA) facilitate
platform independent data acquisition from these sensors using
a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) based on web ser-
vices [2]. OPC-UA also supports vertical integration between
different layers of factory automation, such as Enterprise
Resource and Planning (ERP) systems for factories, Manufac-
turing Execution Systems (MES) and automation systems [2].
It even supports integrating data with systems in partner
companies, as illustrated in Figure 1. Security, reliability and
AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting) are also
integrated into the OPC-UA standard, which supports an API
mapping to XML web services focusing on interoperability
as well as an UA native mapping focusing on efficient low-
bandwidth data transfers [2].
The core characteristics that typically identifies IoT devices,
such as smart sensors are:
• Interaction with the physical world
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2• Have communication capabilities (device to person, de-
vices to device, and device to multiple devices)
• Have some processing capabilities (e.g. support decision
making)
The market for IoTs is believed to be rapidly increasing1, as
services utilising widely deployed sensor networks become
generally available, such as smart home equipment, smart cars
etc. at the same time as any device now typically will have
the capability of being networked. This means that there will
be a large amount of mass-produced and affordable sensor
technologies that can be deployed everywhere, including in
industries.
This means that the production equipment in manufactur-
ing is becoming more and more advanced and smarter by
supporting inherent abilities for decision making. However,
both operation and maintenance require expert knowledge, and
often it will be external parties that have this knowledge. There
will therefore be a need for secure information sharing and
collaboration among stakeholders, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The figure shows that the company often will collaborate
with several third parties, for example external vendors or
entities who will get access to some data from industrial IoT
devices inside the company. Examples of such devices are:
intrusion detection appliances as part of a managed security
service; vendors, suppliers or trusted third parties managing
custom sensors for monitoring vibration, wear or temperature
for Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) as well as flow,
temperature, pressure or position in IIoT devices controlling
industrial process etc.
The main problem is that all these actors need access to their
devices, but should only have access to these according to a
strict definition of need, ensuring minimal spillover of other
company sensitive information about production processes etc.
as possible. Furthermore, not only the device, but also the data
and information generated by the device will need to have
constraints in the form of detailed access control, especially
in multi-sensor devices.
The scenario furthermore shows that the company is per-
forming data analysis, potentially using big data from several
manufacturing plants, in order to extract necessary indica-
tors on production quality while also analysing pre-failure
and wear based on the CBM sensors. Another example is
analysing for signs of cyber-attacks on either the corporate
or process network. External vendors may then be notified if
anomalous data are detected, so that these then can do further
troubleshooting via an interface towards the sensors they are
authorised to manage.
There is also a security and safety risk with such external
parties, since it increases the amount of people who will have
potentially deep access into industrial control networks. This
increases the risk of someone disrupting industrial processes
if they have malicious intent. Not the least will there be a
push towards outsourcing internal services, for example ERP
systems, to cloud service providers, which adds additional
challenges when it comes to managing the services securely,
1In 2020, 25 billion connected things in use:
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2905717
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Figure 1. High-level figure illustrating the problem with data sharing of
sensor data for industrial processes.
as well as reducing the risk for leakage of corporate private
material.
Protecting data transmissions in a secure manner is techni-
cally relatively easy to achieve using existing and standard-
ised cryptographic methods such as Transport Layer Secu-
rity/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) or Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS). However a challenge is managing and
provisioning keys and digital certificates as well as handling
user and service authorisation in a scalable and manageable
way.
The main problem is that current solutions for managing
access in general are too coarse-grained. Firewall rules will
for example give access to the entire CBM or process control
network without limiting access to the sensors and the data
that external parties are allowed to access, especially when
the data is mixed.
This paper discusses how security can be improved in
industries wanting to utilize the power of IoT, especially
focusing on how different stakeholders such as customers,
subcontractors and equipment suppliers can be granted access
to sensor data and other data from the manufacturing process
in a controlled and secure manner, without compromising
sensitive data that are not shared.
The rest of this paper is organised in the following manner:
Section 2 presents the background of industrial IoT, while their
requirements are further explained in section 3. The current
challenges is explained in section 4. Section 5 presents relevant
cases from the industry and section 6 gives an insight into
relevant standards. We present a short term solution that can
improve the current security in section 7, while section 8
elaborates on the possible long term solutions which could
be applied for a more secure and trustworthy IoT. Current
existing research is presented in section 10, Related Work.
Section 11 discusses and summaries the paper, while the last
section; section 12 gives an overview towards possible future
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work.
II. BACKGROUND
New technology and availability of affordable mass-
produced sensors and devices enable new possibilities to meet
requirements for continuous improvements of productivity and
efficiency.
The industry looks at IoT and digitalisation of sensors
as part of Industry 4.0 and sees them as tools to improve
productivity and reduce costs, e.g. through CBM. Low-cost
sensors with good enough precision and lifetime enable more
detailed process insights, and better process optimization.
With the ever increasing capabilities of computing hard-
ware, new technology will cost less and become more readily
available. Small sensors with the ability to be interconnected
into the Internet, enables a plurality of new possibilities.
In an industry setting, this could provide a reasonable and
efficient way to gather more information of the production
process giving new opportunities for optimisation. Easy sensor
deployment increases the potential for cloud based data mining
and analytics using big data from semantic sensor networks,
virtual sensors and complex event processing [3].
A. The Industry 4.0 Challenge
The term industry 4.0 (Industrie 4.0) is a German strategic
initiative for strengthening the competitiveness of the German
manufacturing industry based on an association of repre-
sentatives from business, academia and politics [4]. Similar
ideas have approached also outside the German area, such
as Industrial Internet, Advanced Manufacturing, Integrated
Industry and Smart Industry [5].
There has so far not been any clear definition of what Indus-
try 4.0 is, however a meta-study of 200 publications describing
the concept was done by Hermann et al., who came up with
the following definition of Industry 4.0 [5]: Industrie 4.0 is a
collective term for technologies and concepts of value chain
organization. Within the modular structured Smart Factories of
Industrie 4.0, CPS monitor physical processes, create a virtual
copy of the physical world and make decentralized decisions.
Over the IoT, CPS communicate and cooperate with each other
and humans in real time. Via the Internet of Services (IoS),
both internal and cross-organizational services are offered and
utilized by participants of the value chain.
Security is a challenge with IIoT and Industry 4.0, where
heavily interconnected production systems exchange informa-
tion and data, not only within the manufacturing facility, but
also across the value chain to corporate Enterprise Resource
and Planning (ERP) systems, customers, subcontractors and
equipment suppliers. One large problem with IIoT, is that it
is integrated with the control systems of existing production
facilities which may have a lifetime of decades and was
originally built without security or Internet connectivity in
mind.
The security of control system protocols have also lagged
behind the security of information technology (IT) systems,
and is only now starting to get more widespread use. This
means that many devices, which were never intended to be
networked, may be interconnected in an IIoT setting. This
creates a huge attack surface towards devices that may not be
able to protect neither the data integrity nor data confidentiality
as well as frequently having weak access control mechanisms,
like requiring default user names or passwords [6], [7]. Cars
or airplane systems are examples of such real-time systems
where critical systems often share the same information bus,
which makes it highly dangerous if one device has malicious
behavior.
III. INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS REQUIREMENTS
There are several important requirements that an infrastruc-
ture handling industrial IoT devices must fulfill.
A. Real-time data transfer
Control systems typically require timely delivery of infor-
mation. What is consider real-time depends on the process
being controlled. The inner process control loop may need to
control processes down to millisecond precision without any
loss of control signals. This means that the process control net-
work will have very limited tolerance for variations in latency
which causes problems when using traditional Internet security
protocols such as TLS/SSL. SSL key renegotiation would for
example cause large problems for such a process, and even
running such a process over TCP/IP might not be feasible.
Other processes have less strict real time requirements, and
will be able to run over traditional Internet links without
problems.
B. Availability
It is typically a basic requirement that information is always
available and accessible to authorised users and services. This
is also emphasised in the OEE metric, where availability is
one of the foundational metrics of service quality. Availability
also implies data persistence, i.e. ensuring that data does
not suddenly disappear due to failure (disks wearing out,
lightening strikes etc). Another concern may be legal issues
causing obstacles for data availability between countries, as
4well as a concern that foreign authorities may unrightfully
gain access to company sensitive information.
As industry moves towards an IoT scenario, then there will
be a requirement that these data are available from everywhere
and to everywhere. Data must be available both between
production facilities, device suppliers as well as subcontractors
and the users themselves, who will expect to be able to
purchase tailor-made industrial products. The car industry is
already at the front of such production by providing tailor
made products according to the customers wishes. This again
means that industrial data needs to be made available also
via cloud-based services in order to provide the necessary
scalability to handle a large customer base or for reducing
the operational costs of managing IT equipment.
C. Secure information sharing
Secure information sharing implies that there exists some
data that can be shared with partner organisations, or between
daughter companies, while preserving data confidentiality and
integrity. Existing cryptographic building blocks, such as pub-
lic key encryption, symmetric encryption, message authentica-
tion codes etc. can be used for enforcing this. One of the main
challenges in secure information sharing is scalable solutions
for handling identities and authorizations, including protocols
for managing keys, encryption protocol upgrades and digital
certificates This is also where many IoT protocols (e.g. Zigbee,
ZWave etc.) have been shown to be flawed [8], [9].
Secure information sharing includes non repudiation, so
that partner organisations cannot deny having done certain
operations. The latter can for example be implemented using
secure logging schemes [10], [11].
D. Information Leakage Detection and IPR-handling
Preventing information leakage includes data leakage detec-
tion and IPR handling, for example detecting whether process
sensitive information is leaked from the owning industry,
and found stored in inappropriate places. A possible solution
can be using Digital Rights Management (DRM) type of
technologies to limit the possibilities of data leakage by
strong cryptographic access control methods to the infor-
mation, as well disallowing copy/paste of this information
between a trusted and untrusted application. DRM can be
tied to hardware, like the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
There are already scalable solutions for decrypting quite high
bandwidths today, e.g. satellite HD video etc. Limiting data
access can also be done using more traditional techniques,
such as limiting data access using dumb terminal servers (e.g.
Citrix servers) allowing only limited access to sensitive data
inside the production plant. A challenge in both of these
cases, is that some data leakage still may occur, for example
by taking screenshots of the terminal window or software
with DRM protection, or even taking digital photographs of
the screen used to present these data using external devices
(cameras, mobile phones etc.). The information owner will
therefore need to trust the external parties to some extent,
however it is possible to limit the possibilities for other types
of data analysis and data correlation than the data owner
desires using such measures.
Challenges with real-time data due to network latency may
be a problem in some use scenarios, however other use cases
are less time critical given the latencies of encrypted traffic on
the Internet.
Techniques such as digital watermarking or tagging of
information can be used to enforce nonrepudiation for such
data leakages [12]. It is however questionable how useful
digital watermarking of sensor signals will be for sensor data,
since this adds noise which may interfere with the signal
quality. Another technique that has been proposed is entropy-
based metrics for detecting information leakages and verifying
security policies, in order to detect accidental information
leakages due to faulty security or privacy policies [13].
E. Flexible production
Flexible production is at the core of the Industry 4.0 vision
and implies a requirement for reconfigurability of production
cells within the industry, so that these easily can be repurposed
and assigned to other product lines on demand according
to purchase orders. This implies that there must be tight
integration between the ERP, MES and factory automation
system, so that production cells can be reprogrammed, moved
and assigned to the product lines where they are most urgently
needed, without compromising the logistics of raw materials,
dependent products and finished products.
F. Decision support
Decision support systems can be used both for planning the
production, for condition-based maintenance as well as for
handling logistics. Information can be mined using different
data mining techniques such as data warehousing or big data
analysis in combination with artificial intelligence or learning
systems. Another component that frequently is used with
decision support systems is ontology based reasoners that are
able to infer new knowledge based on information stored in
the ontology [14]. Decision support is traditionally done in-
house, but can also be done distributed based on data in the
cloud, for example to measure customers opinions towards the
company’s products.
CBM is a typical example where third parties can have ac-
cess to analysing and monitoring facilities, and can have means
for requesting shutdown of equipment based on condition data.
G. Fine-grained Access Control to Data
Sophisticated access control mechanisms is in particular
relevant when data is shared among multiple parties and
come from a variety of sources, which is the case for typical
IIoT scenarios. It has been suggested that a transition from a
traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) infrastructure
to a more fine-grained Attribute-Based Access Control would
be required in order to manage access to an IoT based
infrastructure [3]. Attribute-based access control mechanisms,
such as the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [15], has for example been proposed used in IoT
5gateways by the EU FP6 integrated project SANY (Sensors
Anywhere2). This project implemented an open web service
based architecture for sensor networks [16]. SANY was based
on the outcome from the EU FP6 project ORCHESTRA,
which provided a specification framework for the design
of geospatial service-oriented architectures and service net-
works [17], as well as a test bed for implementing aspects
of the Geographical DRM reference model (GeoDRM) [18].
SANY is implemented as a network proxy providing a quick
and cost-efficient way to reuse data and services from currently
incompatible sensors and data sources aimed at environmental
monitoring. The SANY project also did the initial prototype
of the GeoXACML OGC standard [19], [20], which provides
geographical access control to sensor devices, based on geo-
graphic locations defined by the Geography Markup Language
version 2 (GML2) [21].
An interesting feature with this architecture, is that it
acknowledges that an IoT architecture will be based on ge-
ographically dispersed sensors, which also means that geo-
graphic access control based on advanced geographic infor-
mation system (GIS) primitives will be needed in order to
manage access to these sensors.
RBAC and ABAC are standard technologies, however they
cannot be yet applied in a straightforward way to IIoT sce-
narios. The SANY web service architecture does for example
not support OPC-UA. However there are research efforts that
in the long run may mitigate this. The PRECYSE project
developed and used the Reversible anonymiser [11], which
enables anonymising messages, using a policy based approach
for specifying which parts that should be anonymised. It
furthermore has the ability to de-anonymise these parts again
for authenticated and authorised users. This solution is under
further development in the currently running SEMIAH project,
together with a graphical block based tool to construct and
mange the polices used by the Reversible Anonymiser [22],
[23].
IV. CHALLENGES
This section describes the main challenges that may occur
when attempting to share data in an industrial internet of
things scenario. The obvious challenge in an industrial setting,
focusing on utilising IIoT for automation, and analytical gains
is how to enssure that the introduced things are secure and
tamper proof. This includes discussing the how IIoT devices
impacts the attack surface. Subsequent sections describe how
to best protect and prevent these attacks on an industrial
internet of things, among others by applying a defense in depth
strategy.
The main challenge is how to balance the need for security
on one side with the ability to share and utilize the possibilities
in IIoT on the other side. What is sufficient and secure enough?
Security is not achieved by only implementing secure de-
vices or encryption of information. In any system, including
IIoT there are some key components that are essential to
achieve a secure solution;
2SANY project: http://www.opengeospatial.org/ogc/regions/SANY
• Secure device
• Access control, including identity management, authenti-
cation and authorization
• Secure communication
• Management, and
• Trust
Access control can be enforced at several layers, should it
be on the network, device or data layer? Access control on
the data layer will give the most flexible solution, but also
represent the most complex authorization scheme.
Many of the industrial sensors are furthermore resource
constrained devices running real-time processes with limited
processing capability, which means that traditional software
security mechanisms, such as using a public key infrastructure
with standard encryption mechanisms may not work due
to unacceptable latencies or lack of processing capacity for
example during key renegotiation. Devices tend to be made to
run on exactly the minimal required hardware specification so
there is little to no leverage to add security components.
Another security challenge is that device manufacturers
have a bad track record when it comes to adding backdoor
capabilities to their devices in order to manage or update these
devices (for example [24]). The original intent for installing
such backdoors may be valid enough, however the problem is
that these typically use a very simple security solution - often
only using a standard username/password, which obviously
is not secure in today’s Internet. It is therefore important
that the devices themselves also can be integrated into the
organisations’ AAA infrastructure.
A. Legacy-systems
One problem in industrial systems occurs when upgrading to
a modern IIoT from an older system which did not account for
global connectivity. This can lead to security issues, especially
when some of the devices have not considered the possibility
of appearing in a non-restricted network, when part of the
control network is being bridged to other networks, which in
turn may be exposed to the Internet. Another problem is that
legacy systems tend to have non-differentiated networks and
coarse-grained access control if any.
B. Threats
The threat landscape is quite different across different
industries and sectors. In some industries the secrecy of the
processing methods are considered essential for the company
existence, while other industries have completely different
issues. Industries with high value IPR’s are also exposed to
more advanced threat actors than industries with less IPR3.
The insider threat is perhaps one of the largest type of
threats in an IIoT scenario, since own employees as well as
vendors and others may be authorised to access and/or control
sensors in the network. New functionality may be added to the
control network, such as remote support or upgrading from
employees home or from partners, desire to get data/statistics
3FireEye Annual Threat Report: https://www.fireeye.com/current-
threats/annual-threat-report.html
6from production. Need a risk assessment when implementing
such solutions. Another challenge is that suppliers may have
their own links towards their systems. If these stop, then this
may even stop the factory.
It is important that fine-grained access to the entire sensor
network can be managed centrally by the network owner, so
that access can be granted or denied quickly and precisely
to specific devices. Certain operations, such as configuration
deployment, should also support multi-party authorisation
policies for example based on key shares [25], [11]. This
reduces the risk that corrupt or radicalised insiders are able to
destabilise the factory infrastructure by deploying malicious
or faulty system configurations. There will for example be
a significant insider threat if laid off employees, or external
parties with terminated contract still have access to the system.
Another example is that the owner may get sensors installed
on the factory premises which communicate with external
parties using mobile communications, for example GPRS,
where the network owner is not aware of what information
the external party is able to extract using these managed
sensors. This is a significant concern, since such sensors often
are based on generic multi-sensor gateway platforms running
traditional operating systems (often Linux) which may be able
to communicate using many wireless different protocols in
addition to the use the sensor is intended for. This means that
a malicious or hacked third party device potentially would be
able to compromise internal wireless sensor networks on the
production facilities.
C. Security Attacks on an IIoT
According to the Jupiter research 38.5 billion IoT devices
will be on the planet by the 2020 [26]. These devices will
mainly be smart phones, smart house devices, e-health devices
and cars, but there will also several unique devices for specific
proposes (e.g. watches, glasses, body analyzers, etc). As the
number of the IoT devices proliferate, the challenges for
security professionals in the form of attack surface and attack
types will increase, perhaps to the level where these problems
become unmanageable. With this tendency, the protection of
these devices will be an extremely important and difficult task.
The number of cyber-attacks shows a concerning tendency.
The number of cyber-attacks is expected to be doubled be-
tween 2011 and 2017 [27] [28]. This tendency predicts an
even higher growth for IoT devices in the future, because
of the huge spread of such devices [29]. Attacks can aim at
stealing personal information, gaining money, etc. The attacks
are also able to intervene with the normal operation and cause
unavailability, annoyance or damage, or they can be used for
preparing further synchronized attacks.
The most dangerous attacks are based on zero day vulner-
abilities, which are formerly unknown attacks that typically
will go undetected by anti-malware software. In this case
the window of exposure and overall impact can be extremely
high. If an unknown software error appears, then millions of
IoT devices can become vulnerable instantly. Several cases
has been detected when critical errors were found in cru-
cial software components (web server application, encryption
Figure 3. General overview of the attack surface of the Internet of Things.
weaknesses, compression software tools etc.) [30] [31]. The
problem escalates if the new vulnerability is not patched
immediately, so that common exploits appear to take advantage
of the vulnerability.
The number of zero day vulnerabilities is expected to be
around 700 by the year of 2015 but it also shows increasing
tendency [32]. Apart from zero day errors there are other seri-
ous threats which are related to configuration errors, improper
usage of tools and also to the human factor. The following
figure shows the main attack surfaces of an average IoT device.
For any IoT device the following relevant attack surfaces
can be mentioned:
• IoT device operating system:
– configuration error (e.g. unnecessary services, fac-
tory default passwords)
– software error (e.g. lack of input data validation,
memory corruption)
• IoT device own software
– configuration error (e.g. weak authentication method,
lack of protection against denial of service)
– software error (e.g. arbitrary code execution though
API)
• IoT device 3rd party software
– configuration error (e.g. lack of encryption, parame-
ter tampering)
– software error (e.g. file inclusion vulnerability)
• error in the communication channel (lack of encryption,
man in the middle, cryptographic weaknesses)
• vulnerability in the internal network devices (e.g. infor-
mation disclosure, traffic poisoning)
• vulnerability in the external individual service provider
(all kind of web service, database service vulnerabilities)
• vulnerability in the cloud service providers
As the number of vulnerabilities increases, the purpose of an
attack has been extended during the years (stealing personal
information, causing annoyance and anger, causing damage,
sophisticated spying, cyber terrorism and even cyber war).
The following types of adversary objectives are the most
relevant [33]:
• information leakage (stealing information e.g. health data,
habits)
7• stealing money (attacking the bank transfer service of an
IoT)
• integrity changing (modifying data for the attacker’s
benefit or causing annoyance)
• damaging reputation (attacking successful companies or
high traffic service providers)
• availability related: wiping data or blocking operation
(causing denial of service can be critical e.g. in the energy
sector)
• sophisticated attacks (malware, attacks through command
and control servers, etc.)
• cyber terrorism (IoT devices can be connected to critical
infrastructures)
A specific IoT device will typically have a specific attack
surface. Several IoT related vulnerability was detected and
analyzed during the last years. An internet connected gun is
analyzed and unauthenticated API and short guessable PIN
is detected in 2015 [34]. A vulnerability in the firmware of
a network device was revealed which would expose millions
of IoT devices to an attack [35]. A baby monitoring device
vulnerability can cause lot of annoyance to its users [36], etc.
The attack on the Internet of Things can be more dangerous
and can have more critical effects if the targeted computer is an
industrial machine. Several virus attack was detected against
SCADA systems during the last decade. The Slammer virus
[37] targeted Nuclear Power Stations in the USA in 2003,
Conficker [38] has several targets including navy systems as
well. The first very sophisticated malware that was detected for
such purposes was Stuxnet [39]. Stuxnet specifically targeted
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) of centrifuges for
separating nuclear material. Stuxnet was designed to infect
modern SCADA systems as well as PLCs. A very similar
malware named Duqu [6] was discovered later which aimed to
collect information for further Stuxnet like attacks. Stuxnet has
several variants, and probably belongs to the same root such
as the Secret Twin of Stuxnet [40] or the Flame [41]. There
are several cases when a malware is customized to specifically
target industrial IoT. A variant of the Havex malware targeted
industrial control system and SCADA users in the middle
of 2014 [42]. Because malware variants appear very rapidly
and can be customized for specific architectures and tasks, it
is clear that Industrial IoT hardly differ as a target, but the
societal effect of a successful attack can be much higher than
attacks on traditional consumer-oriented IoT devices.
V. RELEVANT INDUSTRY CASES
Our main focus has been the process industry and technolo-
gies around integrated operations in oil and gas. As mentioned
initially in this paper, the process industry is one of the
industries for which the concepts of Industry 4.0 will be very
relevant. In our survey where we interviewed managers and
persons in charge of cyber security, IoTs were one of their
main concerns. Manufacturers of equipment and third party
service providers wanted to have access to their equipment
and sensors or IoT devices, which were internal to the plant’s
network. They see IoT as beneficial to both cost and quality,
but struggles to have a security strategy which incorporates
this new paradigm.
Information sharing was not the biggest concern, as data
from IoT devices often were specific for the equipment and
revealed little secret information about the manufacturing
process. However, if increasingly more devices are installed,
then external parties will get a better understanding of the
industrial processes which is not acceptable. Data sharing
was performed by using traditional methods like VPN with
username and password as credentials, firewall routing and
role based access control. It could be initiated by the external
party after the initial registration and configuration processes
were finished. Data quality is a concern, but this will be
discussed in our use case for the oil and gas industry. Lastly,
security of the IoT device itself with resistance to attacks and
hostility was a challenge as hacking could have both a high
cost and be a threat to personnel safety.
There are also other stakeholders who may interact with
the industry, such as environmental authorities and health
and safety authorities. These did traditionally take manual
samples, but are now starting to use sensor network for real-
time sampling either within or outside the industry premises in
order to perform continuous monitoring of emissions or work
environment. This is useful, and such continuous monitoring
can even be used by the company to optimise industrial
processes. There will however be privacy and confidentiality
issues with too fine-grained monitoring of such data. Informa-
tion about problems in production processes could for example
affect the market value of the company. This means that
data access also for public authorities will also require fine-
grained access control as well as pre-processing (for example
averaging data) of the sensor data to avoid leaking detailed
sensitive information that can be used for example to infer
how production processes work.
Our survey for the oil and gas industry focused on equip-
ment manufacturers which wanted to monitor their equipment
when used by oil rigs, mostly for the drilling operation. This
monitoring is part of a condition based maintenance service. In
this case, secrecy of data was a huge problem for information
sharing. The rig operator did not want to share operations
data with the equipment manufacturer, but the equipment
monitoring would reveal many parameters relevant to the
operations as the equipment manufacturer often delivered a
complete drilling package and monitored most equipment
usage. The equipment manufacturer on their side, would not let
outsiders access to the monitoring data as this revealed know-
how about the equipment. These challenges was not related
only to IoT, but IoT can be said to be part of the scenario as
monitoring sensors get more advanced.
Availability was another challenge. Stable Internet connec-
tions with good bandwidth could not be expected as drilling
operations take place all over the world, e.g. on ships where
satellite is the only means for communication.
Data quality was mostly a concern with regards to tamper-
ing, where tampering could lead to false information. False
information could lead to wrong decisions, and as the cost
rates for drilling are very high, wrong decisions could have a
high cost. Tampering was also a concern for rig operators, as
using IoT devices as a backdoor into the control system could
have fatal consequences for personnel and environment safety
8and cost.
Despite all the challenges, the oil and gas industries are
rapidly moving towards the concept of Integrated Operations,
where information sharing and making decisions based on
sensor data will have a big role.
VI. ROADMAP
This section describe a roadmap for how secure information
sharing can be achieved in the industrial internet of things. A
problem when performing large-scale deployment of IIoT de-
vices is that there are standardisation efforts going on, however
there is still a lack of mature standard that have significant
industrial adoption. There are several reasons for this, for
example that what consitutes a thing varies widely from very
simple purposed-build networked devices to embedded devices
running embedded or standard open source or commercial
operating systems. These devices have widely different ca-
pabilities, which also affects what kind of services they can
run to protect their network environment and communication.
Another challenge is that regulators need to start focusing on
the issue of insecure IIoT, and require regulations and contracts
for a certain minimum security standard for IIoT devices. In
parallel with this, there are big players such as ARM, Intel
and Google who have their own IoT device platforms as well
as cloud providers having their proprietary cloud interfaces for
these devices.
The next subsection describes one candidate IETF standard
for securing Internet-based IoT devices. Research, standardisa-
tion and industry adoption by IIoT device vendors is probably
the first step towards increased security in IIoT. In parallel with
this can existing organisation already now use existing good
practices for securing IIoT networks in the short run. There are
also some research initiatives that aim at industrialising secu-
rity solutions built around existing vulnerable IIoT devices and
SCADA systems using techniques such as software-defined
security. In the long run, standardised security solutions based
on existing industry standards for process control such as
OPC-UA that could consolidate the IIoT devices within the
manufacturing plant in a secure way with fine-grained access
control.
A. Security Considerations in the IP-based Internet of Things
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has a work
in progress draft covering security considerations for IP-based
IoT [43]. The draft examines the current state of the art, further
possibilities, and challenges in the security realm of IoT.
An IoT device is referred to as a thing whose life cycle
starts during its manufacturing, and ends when it has been de-
commissioned by its user. During the end of the manufacturing
cycle, the thing has an initial bootstrapping where it securely
joins the IoT network at its location. This also covers the initial
authentication, authorisation and configuration of necessary
parameters for trusted operations in the network. When the
device is connected to the IoT network it is considered
operational until it needs maintenance, for example installing
a software update which is followed by a re-bootstrapping of
said device. This continues until the device is no longer in use
and has been decommissioned.
The life cycle presented is used as a base for identifying
where possible threats could happen. The threat analysis
covers the following protocols: HTTPS, 6LoWPAN, ANCP,
DNS, SIP, IPv6, ND, and PANA. There are several groups of
threats considered which either compromises the thing itself
or the network as a whole: cloning, malicious substitution,
eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, firmware replacement, ex-
traction of security parameters, routing attacks including sink-
hole, black hole, privacy threats, and Denial of Service. There
is also a risk that things can be cloned and sold for a
cheaper price in the market by competitors. Untrusted manu-
factures could also change the functionality of cloned devices
for example by adding a backdoor. Related to the cloning
is malicious substitution where one thing can be swapped
with another “copy” of lower quality, which could lead to
degraded functionality. Eavesdropping attacks could happen
during bootstrapping events before any secure communication
has been established, which can compromise the authenticity
and confidentiality of the communication channel. This phase
may also be vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. Firmware
replacement attacks can happen during a maintenance phase,
where an attacker can exploit the fact that the device is under
update and install malicious firmware.
This draft standard presents the current state of art (2013),
where protocols such as ZigBee, BACNet, and DALI play
the key roles, but the trend is moving towards all-IP solutions.
One of these solutions is the 6LoWPAN working groups which
focuses on transportation of IPv6 packets over IEEE 802.15.4
networks. For IP-based solutions there is a plurality of security
solutions to consider, and the draft identifies and examines the
following: IKEv2/IPsec, TLS/SSL, DTLS, HIP, PANA, and
EAP. One of the problems identified when using an IP based
security solution for IoT is that there are minor differences
between IoT protocols and regular Internet protocols. This
could hamper end-to-end security if communication relies on
protocol translators between sender and receiver.
Five security profiles are defined in the draft standard
ranging from IoT devices with no security needs, home usage,
managed home usage, industrial usage, and advanced indus-
trial usage. The industrial security profile is where operation
on devices relies on a central devices for security, while
advanced IIoT can also enable ad-hoc operations between
themselves or they can have more then one central control
device. Both of these profiles can have a network manager
located in a 6LoWPAN/CoAP network, which also handles
the key management. Under industrial usage, devices are
required to be associated with the network in a secure way
the first time they are introduced. Broadcast messaging should
be secured with entity authentication (ID-CoAPMulticast).
Remote management is done through a backend manager
which is in charge of managing the different software installed
or information exchanged within the network.
The draft identifies that a basic building block when con-
sidering the next step towards a flexible and secure IoT for
networks would be DTLS, One promising implementation
towards embedded development is TinyDTLS which offers
9an open source implementation of the protocol usable for
resource constrained devices. Good solutions for bootstrap-
ping is still lacking, since there is a real need for good
protocols that resolves the initial authentication, authorisation
and configuration. Secure resource discovery security issues is
still unclear, for example on how to handle secure DNS and
time synchronisation. Some vendors have proposed proprietary
extensions to handle this, such as the SmartAMM protocol
developed by Develco systems4. The way security is layered
where each layer take care of its own need, might not be
so feasible for a small device where resources are tight. The
draft argues that there should be more inter-connectivity across
these layers to be efficient and manage the whole security from
link to application instead of having multiple managers.
B. Short-term Solution
There are some basic principles that should be kept during
the protection of IIoT. To prevent and detect any malicious
activity in the short term, the following steps are recommended
to be followed. The objective of the short-term solution is that
a vulnerable infrastructure can be protected using a surround-
ing set of security tools based on existing good practices such
as firewalls, intrusion detection system, vulnerability scanners
etc. The PRECYSE security methodology, tools and architec-
ture is an example of solution based on existing and some
new security components that supports adding protection to a
vulnerable critical infrastructure this way [44]. The PRECYSE
project did for example demonstrate adding protection of
SCADA telecontrol systems in the energy sector [45], as well
as vulnerable city traffic controllers [In press]. The PRECYSE
architecture uses the concept of configurable security Domains
and Enclaves [46], where each Domain enforces a given
security policy for a given Enclave.
Other good practices that can be applied in the short run
are:
1) Network Segregation: One approach that has been pro-
posed for enforcing network segregation, is adding surround-
ing security tools which effectively are able to segregate and
monitor the networks in order to provide higher security
awareness with identification of policy violations [44]. The
objective then adding software-defined security solutions for
segregating the network, as well as monitoring the resulting
network Domains and Enclaves.
2) Continuous Monitoring and Analysis: Computer sys-
tems have become more and more complex which makes the
protection much more difficult. Due to the continuous rapid
development of sophisticated attacks and the previously known
and unknown threats and attack vectors, the most secure
solution is to continuously analyse the system behaviors and
data. All computer system can be analysed in several different
ways.
3) Log Analysis: Most of all computer device and software
such as network devices, operating systems, applications and
all manner of intelligent or programmable devices document
4SmartAMM: https://stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/develco-
products/solutions/smartamm-makes-it-easier-to-monitor-private-households-
electrical-appliances
their activity by producing logs. Logs can be used for audit-
ing, or checking the compliance according to regulations or
trouble shooting. Logs are also good for forensic activities
and detecting intrusion attempts. Several attack types can be
easily recognized by log analysis such as attacks producing
large amount of log entries (e.g. brute forcing). Other types
that have a definite attack pattern can be detected easily as
well. Host-based intrusion detection systems typically support
such log analysis.
4) File Integrity Monitoring: File integrity analysis is
mainly for operating systems and software for validating its
integrity with some verification method. The most frequently
used verification method is the calculation of some kind of
cryptographic checksum (hash) which can be compared to
a base value or a list. Checksum verification can be used
for identifying harmful files (black listing) or it can be used
for identifying allowed files (white listings). The latter is
obviously stricter and more secure however from the point
of view of functionality black listing is easier to implement.
Host based intrusion detection systems typically also support
file integrity monitoring.
5) Network Traffic Analysis: Network monitoring or net-
work traffic analysis is needed for detecting malicious activity
by analyzing the network packets. Intrusion or malicious activ-
ity recognition can be based on patterns or behavior analysis.
However sophisticated malware can hide the information in
covert channels, which can be so subtle that only pixels are
changed in a legitimate picture [6]. In that case, network
traffic analysis can only detect the suspicious destination of
the packet or the amount of network packets that are sent to
the destination (e.g. command and control server).
6) Memory Dump Analysis: Memory dump analysis is one
of the best way of detecting unknown and well known malware
and malicious activity in the operating systems memory.
Volatility framework5 is able to analyse several type of mem-
ory dumps using advanced techniques. Hidden processes as
well as libraries loaded for malicious activity can be detected,
which facilitates the detection of sophisticated intrusions into
the system.
7) Regular Malicious Activity Detecting Tools: In addition
to specific memory, network traffic and file analysis, the usage
of regular Anti-Virus (AV) and security products with up-to-
date attack pattern database and heuristic search methods is a
must.
8) Continuous Updating and Patching: Continuous updat-
ing of the system and software (especially the 3rd party
software) is crucial from the security point of view. Unknown
software errors can provide the possibility of arbitrary code
execution on the operating system for the attacker. In "lucky"
cases a software error only leads to denial of service, which in
itself can have drastic effects on a critical infrastructures, since
availability typically is of paramount importance. Malicious
attacks may be even worse, since they may compromise the
device without being detected, and can be used as a bridgehead
for further attacks into the critical infrastructure as well as for
industry espionage. It is important to monitor security news
5The Volatility framework: http://www.volatilityfoundation.org/
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sources and react on knowledge about new vulnerabilities as
quickly as possible.
9) Regular Vulnerability Testing : The security of a system
is to a large extent determined by the design of the system.
Continuous monitoring should be used to detect any malicious
attempt, and vulnerability testing can draw the attention to
unknown errors. The vulnerability test can be related to the
whole system, or a specific component (e.g. software vulnera-
bility test, penetration test of a specific computer through the
network, etc. )
Vulnerability testing should be done at regular intervals
since a new analysis can reveal new threats.
Vulnerability test can be done in terms of:
• Black box (the attacker has no access to the system and
no previous knowledge)
• Grey box (the attacker is a user of the system with
restrictions)
• White box (the attacker has a good overview of the
system, e.g. administrative rights)
10) Proxy solutions: Using proxy solutions to build pro-
tection around legacy or vulnerable solutions is a well-known
technique for increasing the security. This type of solutions can
implement access control functionality, limit the commands
send to the protected device or network, perform inspection
and filtering, etc. In cases where a sub-set of data should
be made available for e.g. a supplier, the relevant data can
be exported to a DMZ using a trusted process, and thereby
effectively remove the need for giving the supplier access
to the sensitive network. If needed this trusted process can
also implement functionality to reduce the detail level of the
exported data.
C. Long-term Solution
This section outlines possible long-term solutions for im-
proving the security of IIoT devices and facilitating neces-
sary data access. It is assumed that the long-term solution
will include developing a security gateway based on existing
industry standards such as for example OPC-UA. This would
allow for integrating variety of IIoT devices and expose them
to external services according to a strict definition of need.
Significan research and development as well as standardisation
and industry adoption of these standards is however required
before such a solution will be successful.
1) OPC-UA Managed Gateway for Controlled Information
Access: The web service mapping of OPC-UA supports the
WS-Security standard, and the native mapping maps these to
similar cryptographic primitives. OPC-UA supports its own
service discovery, as well as using standard service repositories
such as LDAP or UDDI [2]. OPC-UA defines objects in terms
of variables, methods and events. This object model is mapped
to the address space as nodes which are interconnected by
references. OPC-UA allows for interconnecting existing OPC
solutions using OPC UA wrappers and proxies [2]. Another
method is utilising OPC UA gateways and adapters.
An OPC UA wrapper is able to seamlessly integrate an
OPC COM server [2]. The wrapper is responsible for handling
endpoints and managing UA encoding/decoding, security,
transport and maping the COM server’s address space to
UA [2]. Data change call-backs initiated by the COM server
are returned as OPC UA Publish requests.
An OPC UA proxy allows for conversion in the other
direction, so that OPC COM clients can communicate with
an OPC UA server [2]. A problem with mapping using OPC
UA proxies and wrappers is that it is not able to map new
concepts and technologies to old COM implementations [2].
Specifically, different profiles will be needed for mapping
the OPC Data Access (DA), Alarms and Events (AE) and
Historical Data Access (HDA) specifications to OPC UA,
since these standards have different semantics. Also, previous
OPC specifications did not address security, which means
that functionality for managing confidentiality, integrity and
application authentication must be added on the OPC-UA
side. Also, performance, difference in transmission rate and
latencies can be an issue with such protocol conversion,
depending on the real-time requirements of the use case.
An OPC UA gateway is one possible solution for solving
these issues by integrating the different wrapping components,
as well as adding the necessary security functionality. The
strong inner security model of OPC UA facilitates hiding
security sensitive processes from malicious attacks, whilst
still providing the necessary functionality for accessing the
underlying vulnerable COM-based infrastructure. Figure 2
illustrates at a high level how an UPC OA gateway can be
extended to support a service authorisation layer providing
fine-grained access to underlying OPC UA services based on
an authorisation and privacy policy. The gateway supports
handling and converting messages between OPC UA as well
as the traditional COM-based infrastructure supporting both
OPC DA, A&E and the HDA interfaces via the UA services
API. The gateway concept allows for supporting adapter plug-
in modules for adding new functionality that by default is not
supported by the standard conversion profiles.
VII. RELATED WORK
As the number of IoT devices proliferate, several research
initiatives focus on finding a general solution for the security
of the IoT. Ukil at al. proposed a solution for embedded secu-
rity where the hardware and its data aims to be secured [47].
Also a general solution is proposed by Cisco Security [48]
This is a framework that may be used in protocol and product
development as well as policy enforcement in operational
environments.
In case of Industrial IoT, previous research mainly addresses
threats of IIoT. Sadeghi at al. gives an introduction to Industrial
IoT systems, the related security and privacy challenges, and
an outlook on possible solutions towards a holistic security
framework for Industrial IoT systems [49]. Xu at al. sum-
marises the current state-of-the-art IoT in industries systemat-
ically [50]. Meltzer discusses security aspects of the Industrial
Internet of Things due to the explosion of IP-connected devices
used in such areas as control systems, manufacturing, utili-
ties, and transportation [51]. Other studies focus on specific
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problems of IIoT such as the vulnerabilities and risks in the
industrial usage of wireless communication [52]. NSA pro-
vided a framework description for Assessing and Improving
the Security Posture of Industrial Control Systems [53].
VIII. SUMMARY
This article has proposed a roadmap for handling the
problem of secure information sharing with external vendors
in an IIoT. It proposes how IIoT should be secured both in the
short term by applying existing good practices in a structured
manner, as well as utilising and extending security toolsuites
such as the PRECYSE architecture for protecting vulnerable
IIoT devices. In the long term we envisage that better solutions
will be needed, for example an OPC-UA gateway with support
for very fine-grained access control to data in IIoT devices.
This should be integrated with the organisation’s own single-
sign-on authentication infrastructure, essentially providing the
possibility for assigning or revoking access to individual IIoT
devices as well as providing or denying access to certain data
(individual XML elements or attributes) within messages from
these devices.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Future work involves research on integrated solutions for
protecting vulnerable IIoT devices, for example by building
software-defined security solutions on top of existing frame-
works such as the PRECYSE architecture [44]. Long-term
research could involve implementing an OPC-UA gateway
with support for firewall functionality as well as very fine-
grained access control, for example based on the Reversible
Anonymiser, which would allow for policy-controlled access
to individual data in the OPC-UA messages [11].
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